In the current debates surrounding various job
guarantee programs (in association with the Chartalist
or Modern Money perspectives), it might prove helpful to review some aspects of
the Works Progress Administration (renamed in 1939 as Work Projects
Administration). While the WPA was not a
“job guarantee” program, it nevertheless points to a number of issues that are
under current discussion, including those of the nature of the projects
undertaken, impact on the larger economy, concerns surrounding bureaucratic
impediments, etc. Let’s begin with an introductory statement pertaining
to the political and economic orientation of Franklin Delano Roosevelt (and his
Administration).
Roosevelt was not
a progressive. He ran on a balanced budget platform, and initially attempted to
fulfill his campaign promise of reducing the federal budget by slashing
military spending from $752 million in 1932 to $531 million in 1934, including
a 40% reduction in spending for veteran’s benefits which eliminated the
pensions of half-a-million veterans and widows and reduced the benefits for
those remaining on the rolls. As well, federal spending on research and
education was slashed and salaries of federal employees were reduced. Such
programs were reversed after 1935. And one might recall that Roosevelt
attempted to return to a balanced budget program in 1937, just as the economy
appeared to be slowly recovering. The result was a renewed depression that
began in the fall of that year and ran through 1938.
Thus, the Roosevelt Administration was forced into progressive activism because
of massive—and organized—popular discontent based mainly in working class and
small farmer organizations. The union movement was rejuvenated through the
formation of the CIO, farmers organized to prevent the forced sales of their
properties (and this often included the threat of armed action), rent strikes
were rampant, etc. Chicago, New York, other cities saw massive demonstrations.
“Riots” shook the Kentucky coal fields. One must remember that the communist
party was large (as these parties go), active, and popular. The specter of
revolution was in the air and some politicians responded. Hamilton
Fish Jr. instructed his fellow Congressmen, “(i)f we don’t
give (security) under the existing system, the people will change the system.
Make no mistake about that.”
The WPA was one of several programs developed to
respond to this supposed threat. Initially,
the Roosevelt Administration authorized the Federal Emergency Administration of
Public Works in 1933 (renamed in 1939 as the Public Works Administration). The PWA allocated over $6 billion to private
firms that actually undertook the large scale projects ordered by government.
Dams, including Grand Coulee, hospitals, bridges (the Triborough Bridge and
Lincoln Tunnel in New York City), etc.
In
the same year, the Civilian Conservation Corps (ostensibly Roosevelt’s favorite
such program) was organized. Exceptionally active in erosion control,
reforestation, the creation of public parks, etc., the CCC hired 2 million
young men over the course of its history. The fundamental difference between the CCC and
the PWA was that workers on CCC projects were hired directly by the government.
And this funding relationship served as the model for the WPA.
The
WPA was under the direction of Harry Hopkins, a notable figure in his day. While the program was officially terminated in
1943, U.S. entry into WWII effectively ended its existence. On average through
1941, the WPA employed about 3 million people each month. If we include
employees in the CCC and the National Youth Administration (a separate program
under the WPA), total employment in government contracted work came to roughly
4.3 million per month. This represented 8-9% of the U.S. labor force. Originally,
the WPA was an extension of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration—the
first federally-funded welfare program in the U.S. One rationale for the WPA was that it was
better to put people to work performing useful tasks rather than merely
receiving assistance: off the dole and on the job.
A
maximum work week was set at 30 hours, and pay was set at “the prevailing
wage.” This latter standard raised some unintended humorous criticism. Senator Richard Russell of Georgia complained that: “In
the State of Tennessee the man who is working with a pick and shovel at 18
cents an hour is limited to $26 a month, and he must work 144 hours to earn
$26. Whereas the man who is working in Pennsylvania has to work only 30 hours
to earn $94, out of funds which are being paid out of the common Treasury of
the United States” (In Couch, 2008).
The WPA was not intended as a
“full employment” program. Only one household member could be employed under
the program (it was usually males), though one does find female heads of
households so employed. It should also
be noted that state and local governments were required to contribute 10-30% of
the costs of the various projects undertaken. Over its life, total spending on WPA projects
amounted to about $13.4 billion, roughly 2% of GDP over those years.
And what were those projects? Was this simply a “make work” program that
made little difference in the long run? Or, was the WPA integral to the larger
economy and its contributions socially useful? A truncated tally follows. (See below for a slideshow of projects under the WPA)
- 560,000 miles of roads built or improved
- 20,000 miles of water mains, sewers constructed
- 417 dams built
- 325 firehouses built; 2384 renovated
- 5,000 schools constructed or renovated
- 143 new hospitals, 1,700 improved
- 2,000 stadiums, grandstands built
- 500 landing fields; 1,800 runways (including participation in the construction of LaGuardia Airport, NYC)
- State and municipal parks, including the foundation of the extensive California state park system.
- 100 million trees planted
- 6,000 miles of fire and forest trails created
- Education: Through 1941, 1 million enrolled in adult education courses, 37,000 children in classes and nursery schools; 280,000 received music instruction, 67,000 art instruction.
- Libraries were built. These were especially directed toward poor and rural communities.
- Zoo buildings constructed
In addition to the above, one
should note the WPA’s contribution to the cultural life of the country. Under
the direction of Hallie Flanagan, the Federal Theatre Project mounted 1,200
productions including 300 new plays. Audiences were estimated at 25 million in
forty states, many of whom had never before seen a play. As well, WPA programs
included Federal Music, Federal Arts, and Federal Writers’ Projects. This
latter program produced the most notable “Slave Narrative Collection,”
consisting of 10,000 pages of interviews with former slaves, a continuing
treasure-trove for researchers. Last, let us not forget the famous murals that
were produced by artists hired by the WPA. These dot the country from post offices
(though these were mainly funded by the Treasury Department through a grant
from the government) to college buildings, to government buildings. Included in
this array were those painted by Diego Rivera for the City College of San
Francisco, Anton Refregier in the Rincon Annex Post Office, San Francisco, and
Thomas Hart Benton in the Missouri State Capitol rotunda.
Let us now turn to some numbers and tell something
of a story about some of the macro effects of the jobs programs.
YEAR
|
FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT SPENDING
(BILLIONS $)
|
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
(BILLLIONS $)
|
INF
RATE
|
FEDERAL
DEFICIT
(BILLIONS $)
|
UNEMPLOYMENT
RATE
(ESTIMATED)
|
ADJUSTED
|
WAGE RATE
MANUFACTURING
(1923-25=100)
|
1930
|
4.0
|
91.2
|
-2.7
|
-0.9
|
8.7
|
8.9
|
92
|
1931
|
4.1
|
76.5
|
-8.9
|
0.1
|
15.9
|
15.7
|
78
|
1932
|
4.3
|
58.7
|
-10.3
|
1.6
|
23.6
|
22.9
|
66
|
1933
|
5.1
|
56.4
|
-5.1
|
1.8
|
24.6
|
21
|
73
|
1934
|
5.9
|
66.0
|
+3.5
|
2.1
|
21.7
|
16.2
|
86
|
1935
|
7.6
|
73.3
|
+2.6
|
3.0
|
20.1
|
14.4
|
91
|
1936
|
9.2
|
83.8
|
+1.0
|
4.0
|
16.9
|
10
|
99
|
1937
|
8.8
|
91.9
|
+3.7
|
2.6
|
14.3
|
9.2
|
109
|
1938
|
8.4
|
86.1
|
-2.0
|
1.2
|
19.0
|
12.5
|
91
|
1939
|
9.3
|
92.2
|
-1.3
|
2.1
|
17.2
|
11.3
|
100
|
1940
|
10.1
|
101.4
|
+0.7
|
3.1
|
14.6
|
9.5
|
108
|
1941
|
14.2
|
126.7
|
+5.1
|
4.7
|
9.9
|
6.0
|
-----
|
1942
|
35.5
|
161.9
|
+11
|
19.5
|
3.9
|
3.1
|
-----
|
Source: Historical Statistics of the United States
The first matter to note is the unemployment rate.
Official estimates did not count WPA (or CCC) workers as employed. Rather, they
remained on the unemployed lists as they were not working in private sector
jobs. The adjusted rate includes these workers as working—as they were. This
results in a roughly 6% differential and paints a much rosier picture of the
effects of the WPA and other programs in reducing unemployment.
The second issue is that of the relation between
government deficit spending and inflation. Observe that in the 1930-32 period,
when private sector spending fell precipitously and government spending was
flat, the economy suffered deflation and tumbling GDP—the worst possible development
in a capitalist economy as the specter of a declining price level and GDP generates
pessimistic “animal spirits” (Ã la Keynes). The growing federal government
deficits of 1932-33 were not the result of increased spending, but declining
tax revenues that resulted from declining incomes and spending in the private
sectors. With increased government spending and accompanying deficits, GDP
began to increase as did prices. But observe that in the heyday of the WPA, the
CPI rose to a mere 3.7% rate: this is in the normal range for a capitalist
economy and clearly does not represent “real” inflation, but merely rising
prices which is necessary to induce more optimistic animal spirits. Indeed,
though this is not shown, private investment was rising during this period. As
well, with rising investment and rising employment (private as well as public),
real wages also rose, reaching their 1923-25 level by 1936. (Here, I use wages
in manufacturing as a proxy for economy-wide real wages, as most commentators
focus on manufacturing, then a much larger portion of the economy, as a key
indicator of economic health.)
We also observe that when the Roosevelt
Administration returned to its balanced budget program in 1937, things
deteriorated: GDP fell, unemployment rose, real wages fell, private investment
fell (though not shown here), and deflation once again reared its ugly head. And,
as is well known, with U.S. entry into WWII, government spending and deficits
soared, but the economy finally recovered. Had the federal government spent as
much in the 1930’s to generate useful, constructive activities, rather than
destructive activities associated with war, it can be argued that the
depression would have been over within a year, even with the financial debacle
of the late 1920’s.
Last, let’s consider two standard complaints about
government bureaucracies: they are too large, unwieldy, thus inefficient; and
they are prone to “capture” by private interests, thus do not serve the “public
good.” Dealing with the second issue first, I have no doubt that this is a
problem in the present period at a minimum. If one puts industry pimps in charge
of the various bureaus, if one perpetrates a campaign denigrating public
service, if one treats “public servants” as slaves, then government bureaus are
ripe for such capture. Indeed, an argument can be made that over the last 30
years that has been the objective of various administrations—Democrat as well
as Republican. The public servants of the 1930’s seem to fit a different mold,
at least in the main. If one reads about the self-sacrificing work of a Harry
Hopkins, of a Hallie Flanagan, of the government employees in the trenches, a quite
altered picture emerges. These people were, again, in the main,
public-spirited, rather selfless, quite competent, and hard-working. We should
not hypothesize about the behavior and character of people of different eras
using the rather depraved standard of the current period. (See Quinn, 2008 for
some insight into the character of WPA personalities.)
The other issue is that of the size of such
bureaucracies. The WPA had a central administrative personnel of around 2,000
people (depending on month and year). Most of WPA employees were at the state
and district offices where the projects were actually undertaken and the hiring
of project employees took place. Again, depending on month and year, this
number ranged from 15 to 35 thousand. The ratio of government employees to
project workers—a more telling figure—ranged from 11 to 21 per 1,000 project
workers, with the average running about 13/1,000 (Final Report of the WPA Program, p. 10). That is, less that 2% of
the total number of workers in the WPA program consisted of administrative
personnel. How would that ratio compare with, say, General Motors?
An examination of previous government programs such
as the WPA assists in developing a clearer understanding of various versions of
a job guarantee program, in both its positive and negative features. Obviously,
the WPA was not such a program, but it points in that direction. Taking account
of the differences in the eras of the 1930’s and the 21st century,
what lessons can be drawn from previous experiments—and the WPA was an
experiment—and what can current imaginations produce in the present period. As
Keynes stated at the beginning of the Great Depression: “As soon as we have a
new atmosphere of doing things, instead of one of smothering negation,
everybody’s brains will get busy, and there will be masses of claimants for
attention, the precise character of which it would be impossible to specify
beforehand” (Keynes [1929] 1972, 99).
References:
Couch,
Jim. "Works Progress Administration". EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by
Robert Whaples. March 16, 2008. URL http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/couch.works.progress.administration
Federal
Works Agency. Final Report on the WPA Program, 1935-43. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government
Printing Office. 1947
Keynes. J. M. [1929]
1972. “Can Lloyd George Do It?” In Collected Works, Vol. 9. Pp. 86-125.
Quinn, Susan. Furious
Improvisation. New York: Walker Publishing Co. 2008

0 comments:
Post a Comment